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TO YOUR HEALTH
Nudging the FDA
W. NICHOLSON PRICE II & I. GLENN COHEN
There’s a better way between the contending libertarian and paternalist
 approaches to regulating drugs.
hould terminally ill patients have access to drugs that have not been yet been approved as effective but
 have been shown in preliminary stages to be safe? Should doctors be allowed to prescribe drugs to
 patients for unapproved indications, uses for which they believe the drug will work but for which no drug
 trials have yet been conducted? Should drug companies be able to communicate directly with patients? All
 of these questions are at the heart of the proper role for the government in drug regulation.
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates about a quarter of the U.S. economy.
 Among its many responsibilities is the regulation of roughly $275 billion in yearly sales of drugs, both
 prescription and over the counter. Although the FDA’s role in drug regulation is frequently perceived as
 focusing on just a few actions—most notably, the approval or rejection of new drugs and the possibility of
 recalling drugs from the market based on safety concerns—it exercises many other powers that affect how
 drugs reach doctors and patients, and the information they receive about the drugs they prescribe and take. It
 also controls the accelerator and brake pedals on drug development and innovation through its control of
 market exclusivity for approved new drugs.
The FDA’s regulation of drugs is frequently the subject of policy debate, with arguments falling into two
 camps. On the one hand, a libertarian view of patients and the health care system holds high the value of
 consumer choice. Patients should get all the information and the drugs they want; the FDA should do what it
 can to enforce some basic standards but should otherwise get out of the way. On the other hand, a paternalist
 view values the FDA’s role as an expert agency standing between patients and a set of potentially dangerous
 drugs and potentially unscrupulous or at least insufficiently careful drug companies.
We lay out here some of the ways the FDA regulates drugs, including some normally left out of the debate,
 and suggest a middle ground between libertarian and paternalistic approaches focused on correcting
 information asymmetry and aligning incentives.
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How the FDA Regulates Access to Drugs
he FDA is the undisputed gatekeeper of the U.S. drug market. No drug may be marketed or sold in the
 United States without FDA approval, and approving new drugs is among the FDA’s most public and
 well-known roles. Approval of a major new drug, or refusal to approve a promising drug, garners news
 headlines and drives changes in drug company stock prices. The process of winning approval is hugely
 complex and expensive, even once a drug’s clinical trials have demonstrated that a drug is safe and
 effective. The company that seeks to market a new drug (in the FDA’s parlance, the drug’s “sponsor”) must
 submit a New Drug Application that typically spans thousands of pages of data and analysis. Clinical trials
 for new drugs take more than six years on average, and the FDA approval process itself adds more than a
 year on average. At the end of this lengthy process is a stark decision: The drug is approved, or it is not.
 Accordingly, and understandably, much debate about the FDA’s role in regulating drugs focuses on the
 approval process.
In addition to the central gatekeeping function of allowing market access for a new drug, the FDA uses a
 wide array of tools and processes to regulate the way companies make and sell drugs; how doctors can
 prescribe them; and how patients are advised to take them. Several are worth pointing out; some are well
 characterized, but others are more nebulous. All are implicated by the ongoing debates about the FDA’s role
 in balancing the safety of drugs against their potential use in treatment.
n a function tightly tied to the FDA’s role as a formal gatekeeper in approving New Drug Applications, the
 agency regulates how and when clinical trials take place. The FDA approves the different phases of
 clinical trials, which test for safety and efficacy in human subjects, and determines what sorts of trials will
 be permitted. The FDA’s formal approval of different stages of drug development thus reaches back much
 further than final approval.
The FDA also acts as an informal gatekeeper throughout the entire process of drug development. Drug
 manufacturers know what the FDA looks for in applications, what kind of drugs have trouble generating
 sufficient safety data, and what kinds of clinical trials might be viewed as problematic. As a result, “[o]ut of
 fear of rejection or stringency at the FDA, sponsors abandon hundreds if not thousands of new therapeutic
 ideas every year.”  For instance, after the Vioxx scandal, in which Merck’s top-selling painkiller was
 discovered to cause serious heart problems, the FDA requested major studies of heart effects for many
 similar drugs. The FDA also required much higher levels of statistical certainty for certain types of clinical
 trial results, especially those that prompt the early ending of clinical trials. Regardless of whether such
 requirements are justified, it means that a company with limited resources is much less likely to pursue
 those drugs, and will instead choose other research avenues.
The FDA also exercises significant power over whether drugs can be made available to acutely ill patients
 before the drugs are approved. Since 1987, the FDA has allowed companies to provide drugs to some
 patients who cannot participate in clinical trials before those trials are complete, if several criteria are met:
 no other treatment exists, benefits outweigh the risks, and providing the drugs won’t compromise the
 clinical trial process. Typically, it is not possible to satisfy these criteria before drugs reach the final phase
 of clinical trials. Even in those cases where the requirements are satisfied, some have argued, the procedural
 hurdles involved in getting the FDA’s permission can be substantial.
Patient advocates have chafed at the FDA’s restrictions, and have challenged them in court without success.
 For example, consider the story of 19-year-old Abigail Burroughs. She was diagnosed with head and neck
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 cancer in 1999 and tried chemo and radiation therapy without success. On her physician’s recommendation
 she tried to enroll in clinical trials for two drugs in development, etuximab and gefinitib, but was denied
 entry because she did not meet the inclusion criteria. In 2001 she was able to enroll in a third clinical trial
 but died soon into the trial.
Her father then created the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, a group of parents of
 children with terminal illness. In the leading case, Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach, the Alliance sued the
 FDA, claiming a constitutional right to access drugs that had cleared Phase 1 of clinical testing (which
 focuses on toxicity) but had not yet been approved. Their claim was that the FDA’s decision to restrict
 access by making the sale of unapproved drugs illegal was state action that violated these patients’ right to
 be free from deprivations of their life or liberty without due process of law. (Full disclosure: One of us
 represented the FDA in parts of this case.) After achieving initial success before the Federal Court of
 Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a full bench of that Court rejected the Alliance’s claims, allowing the FDA to
 continue to block access to these drugs until approval. The FDA retains the ability to restrict the distribution
 of drugs during clinical trials and actively exercises this form of control over drug access.
Once a drug is approved, the FDA can require stringent restrictions on how and to whom a drug is prescribed
 through a procedure called Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS). Under the Food and Drug
 Administration Amendments Act of 2007, the FDA can require that companies implement any of a broad
 set of measures to ensure that drugs are prescribed in specific ways to avoid risks. These range from merely
 requiring the distribution of a medication guide with the drugs to requiring doctor’s certification about the
 use of the drug, requiring that patients enroll in a centralized registry, or requiring that the drug only be
 dispensed at specific specialty pharmacies. Notably, the Office of the Inspector General found in 2012 that
 although the FDA has imposed REMS on more than 200 drugs, it still lacks a reliable way to determine
 whether they are working. Nonetheless, REMS provide a potent way for the FDA to exercise tight control
 over the way new drugs are used.
Later in a drug’s life (typically well after the patents covering the drug and protecting it from competition
 have expired), the FDA may, at a manufacturer’s request, permit a drug to change from being prescription-
only to being sold over the counter. This potentially creates much larger markets for drugs, since over-the-
counter drugs typically have much lower costs than their prescription alternatives (because patients can buy
 them without visiting a doctor). Since insurance coverage usually requires a prescription, companies make
 up for the price decrease through vastly increased volume. To justify the shift, a drug company must
 demonstrate to the FDA that the drug is “safe and effective for use by the general public without seeking
 treatment by a health professional.” Over the past twenty years, more than 700 drugs have made this switch,
 including the allergy medications Claritin (loratidine) and Allegra (fexofenadine), and the acid-reducing
 drugs Prevacid (lansoprazole) and Prilosec (omeprazole). On the other hand, the FDA has rejected many
 proposals to make the switch, such as Merck’s request to make its cholesterol-lowering statin, Mevacor
 (lovastatin), available without a prescription. Statins have been available over the counter in the United
 Kingdom since 2004.
Finally, the FDA can remove a drug from the market entirely, typically when new safety concerns arise once
 the drug is in wide use. The FDA has the statutory authority to order a recall and withdraw a drug’s
 marketing approval, but this step is usually unnecessary; most companies will withdraw a drug from the
 market upon the FDA’s request.
The FDA’s drug approval process not only affects access in this very direct way, but more indirectly by
 calibrating the pace and incentive of drug discovery and development. The longer, more expensive, and
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 more uncertain the pathway to approval, the less likely drug companies are to take a chance on a drug that
 may fail to show results or may face difficulties securing intellectual property protection. Further, the design
 of the pathway also strongly influences the corporate ecology of drug companies and issues such as mergers
 and acquisitions and the focus on blockbusters. Drug companies need to be a certain size to navigate the
 shoals of this process and have a portfolio of drugs in development that can capture enough market share to
 cross-subsidize the many drug failures.
he FDA’s control over access to drugs is not limited to the physical drug itself. It also exerts potent
 forms of control over the information that is distributed about drugs, both to doctors and to patients. It
 has stringent rules about what drug companies can tell doctors about the drugs they sell. In general, drug
 companies are prohibited from promoting unapproved uses of drugs (even though a large fraction of
 prescriptions are for such off-label uses). The FDA can subject drug company employees, executives, and
 the companies themselves to civil fines or criminal prosecution for this behavior. The FDA has historically
 been quite strict about off-label promotion; in the past decade more than twenty settlements have been
 reached with drug companies, most for hundreds of millions of dollars. Five settlements for more than $1
 billion have been reached in the past five years alone, including GlaxoSmithKline’s $3 billion settlement in
 2012 and Pfizer’s $2.3 billion settlement in 2009.
This strong prohibition of off-label promotion has recently been weakened. A 2012 decision by the U.S.
 Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (which hears appeals from Federal cases in Connecticut,
 New York, and Vermont) cast doubt on the FDA’s ability to criminally prosecute drug company
 representatives for promoting off-label uses of drugs. The case, United States v. Caronia, considered
 whether the First Amendment prohibited the FDA from criminally prosecuting a drug company
 representative promoting a drug’s off-label use.  Specifically, Alfred Caronia told an FDA informant doctor
 that Orphan Medical’s drug Xyrem could be used not only for its FDA-approved uses, but also for treating
 insomnia and other medical problems. The government brought criminal charges against Caronia (and
 others, who settled). The appellate court held that the First Amendment protected Caronia’s speech, and that
 his speech was at the heart of the charges against him; therefore, the court overturned Caronia’s conviction.
 The court still left room for the FDA to charge companies for fraudulent speech or marketing drugs they
 intend for off-label use, rather than attacking promotion directly. In addition, the FDA could still prosecute
 promotion directly in the 92 percent of the country not governed by Second Circuit law. Companies have
 not yet jumped on the First Amendment bandwagon, and several have settled off-label promotion claims
 after Caronia, including Johnson & Johnson’s $2 billion settlement in November 2013.
In addition to the information given by drug companies to doctors, the FDA regulates the advertisements
 displayed directly to consumers on television, the internet, the radio, and in print media. The United States
 is nearly unique in allowing this sort of direct-to-consumer advertising; New Zealand is the only other
 country to permit it. Drug companies currently spend around $3 billion yearly advertising directly to
 consumers, the majority of which is concentrated on a relatively small number of recently approved, top-
selling drugs. This was not always the case. Drug company advertising in non-print media increased
 dramatically after the FDA in 1997 relaxed its previously stringent requirements about the amount of
 cautionary information required to be included in advertisements.
Under current law, for an advertisement to be acceptable, it must disclose the major side effects of the drug
 and must give the consumers ways that they can find more information about the drugs by phone or through
 the internet. This accounts for the bizarre, almost surreal character of these television ads, which seem to
 come out of nowhere to describe vague, unfamiliar ailments that we are told we might have, and to promise
 that some strangely named therapy can help us—but which then go on to list a large number of invariably
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 serious side effects.
The FDA also regulates the types of claims that can be made about drugs; companies are not permitted to
 make false or misleading claims. The FDA exercises this authority with some difficulty, however. It
 frequently takes months for FDA reviewers to evaluate an advertisement, find it problematic, and
 communicate problems to the sponsoring company. In many cases, by the time the FDA informs the
 company about the problems, the ad campaign has already run its course.
Libertarians vs. Paternalists
ne major attack on the FDA and its regulation of drugs comes from a philosophical core we loosely
 describe as “libertarianism.” That term means different things in different contexts (for example, it
 carries with it one connotation in debates about free will and another in debates about taxation). In the
 context of objections against the FDA, it begins with the premise that ordinarily individuals are the best
 judge of their own interests, and that when the state tries to substitute its judgment for that of the individual
 in a way that is one-size-fits-all the state will most likely get it wrong. Second, this power of the individual
 to make his or her own choices is most important when it comes to control over the body. The locus
 classicus here is the work of John Locke. It is a basic necessity of freedom, of being a person, that a person
 be in control over his or her body, a sovereign, a self-owner, and from this are derived the ownership of
 property and all other accouterments of modern citizenship. Third, that control over one’s body is
 particularly salient when one is trying to protect one’s life, for without one’s life this freedom is
 meaningless. Thus, the right to defend oneself, a right older than Blackstone, is often crowned preeminent
 among the rights enjoyed by individuals.
Even with this bare-bones articulation, it is clear that these principles collide with any regulation of drugs.
 To see this, take the issue of access to experimental drugs that was front and center in the Abigail Alliance
 case. The terminally ill individuals who brought suit claimed that they were willing to take the risks for a
 chance at recovery or extending their lives, and that they were better judges about the risks and benefits
 involved than the FDA. They claimed that it was up to them to decide what to do with their bodies. They
 also argued that the constitutional right they claimed to have in this case was analogous to self-defense, or,
 in the words of one prominent legal academic, “medical self-defense.”
There is a similar clash between libertarian principles and the FDA’s regulation of direct-to-consumer
 advertising and off-label drug promotion. Libertarians argue that it should be up to individuals, on
 consultation with physicians, to decide whether a particular use of a drug is appropriate for them. Indeed, in
 some ways the cutting off of information by the FDA is more threatening to them in that the FDA is seeking
 not only to regulate what individuals put in their bodies but what information they may consider in their
 minds.
In the opposite corner philosophically are a group we might call “hard paternalists”, though the group is
 somewhat heterogenous. Sometimes, some argue, the evidence weighing against a particular choice is so
 strong that individuals cannot be permitted to make that choice. This rationale most clearly underlies the
 FDA’s entire structure of market pre-approval. Under the 1962 Kefauver Harris Amendment, the FDA may
 not approve a drug for marketing unless it determines that the drug is both safe and effective, no matter
 whether consumers might like to buy it or not. Sarah Conly and George Rainbolt have written more recently
 justifying this form of “hard” paternalism in the requirement that certain drugs be available by prescription
 only.
There is also a related but separate argument in favor of FDA regulation. While paternalist arguments
3
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 typically focus on protecting the individual who would take the drug, some have also justified FDA
 regulation on behalf of benefits to others. One argument scholars offered for the FDA policy at issue in
 Abigail Alliance was that allowing the purchase of drugs outside of clinical trials would greatly delay
 recruitment for those clinical trials. The end result was that it would take much longer to approve these
 drugs or determine that they were ineffective, and that many future users would suffer because of this delay.
 So on that basis it was argued that it is necessary to channel terminally ill patients into clinical trials and not
 make the drug available to them outside of those trials.
Information Asymmetries and Nudges
ard paternalism is not the only potential response to the libertarian attack on FDA regulation, nor is it
 the most effective one. Rather, one can accept but qualify the basic libertarian premises of self-
ownership and that individuals are the best judges of their own welfare. According to a well-established
 political theory tradition, individuals can only make good choices when they have good information. In this
 view, regulation of the channels of information is a prerequisite for exercising meaningful choice, not in
 conflict with it. The combined activities of the FDA and the Federal Trade Commission can be defended,
 then, as attempts to prevent the misleading of consumers.
Second, the regulation of information and, indeed, access to therapeutics is particularly justified in health
 care because of the strong information deficit faced by consumers. As Nobel Prize-winning economist
 Kenneth Arrow famously argued in the 1960s, individuals have a very hard time evaluating health care’s
 value to them. Health care is often conceptualized as a “credence good” by economists because patients
 cannot verify the effectiveness or quality of a treatment. They may have gotten better because of treatment,
 they may have gotten worse because of the treatment, or the treatment may have had no effect. Even well-
educated experts often cannot know which is the case, and so most patients clearly have a limited ability to
 evaluate the effect of the treatment and almost no ability to determine causation.
The FDA’s role is in part to correct this problem. It determines which drugs work by evaluating the data
 provided by pharmaceutical companies, and allows those companies to advertise the drug only for the
 indications for which it has determined the drug to be safe and effective. Without these safeguards, some
 would argue, drug companies would not have the incentive to conduct expensive clinical trials, many of
 which fail. Instead drug companies might prefer a market for drugs that resembles the one we have for
 vitamins and other supplements, a free-for-all where anyone can enter, advertise, and sell without proving
 the safety or efficacy of the product.
One can combine this qualified defense of paternalism from a philosophical perspective with a qualification
 of the level of paternalism of the intervention. In particular, recent work in behavioral law and economics
 has emphasized two milder forms of intervention: “asymmetrically paternalistic” interventions or
 “libertarian paternalism” in the form of “nudges.”
Asymmetrically paternalistic interventions create “large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing
 little or no harm on those who are fully rational.”  “Nudges”, on the other hand, set default rules (among
 other approaches) so they can “influence behavior while also respecting freedom of choice.” Those default
 rules may be sticky—that is, they take some effort to change—which means that those with a strong
 preference can overcome the stickiness and change the outcome, but those without strong preference will
 leave the choice set at the socially optimal level. Combining these two vectors of “soft paternalism”—
mandates to provide accurate information so that the patient’s choice is indeed informed, along with
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 while preserving freedom to choose—would provide something of a middle ground for the FDA to consider
 before it uses the “big guns” of “hard paternalist” mandates. We can recast some policy choices the FDA
 already makes in this light, but this also suggests new possible pathways for the agency.
The FDA’s strict regulation of the quality and veracity of drug information for patients makes sense under
 this framework since good information is a prerequisite for meaningful choice. Similarly, we can conceive
 of the rules governing the substitution of generic drugs for branded drugs along these lines. The socially
 optimal policy is to prefer broad substitution of generic drugs, because they are much less costly and by
 definition have the same effect. However, the system can still preserve consumer choice, if doctors can
 specify that a prescription be filled with the branded drug, which creates a sticky default for the socially
 optimal choice. Those with strong preference for their preferred branded version may get it (albeit at a
 higher cost and requiring the intervention of a doctor).
And what might new FDA policies treading this middle ground look like? The universe of possibilities is
 vast, but here are three suggestions. It could require prescriptions or create other “speed bumps” to
 accessing drugs prone to abuse, but not completely block access. Patients who overcome these speed bumps
 are more likely to be informed or have intense preferences, while those who do not can be channeled toward
 what is determined to be the socially optimum policy. Second, it could require patients to exhaust
 conventional therapies and demonstrate that they cannot get into a clinical trial of an experimental drug, but
 then allow them to purchase it outside of the clinical trial regime. Third, it could allow drug companies to
 make available information about unapproved uses, but require multiple procedural steps to obtain that
 information, such as individually initiated registration and a waiting period.
These are just the tip of the iceberg, and FDA policymakers could certainly formulate many other, more
 sophisticated approaches of this kind. Not every policy choice is amenable to this middle ground, of course.
 In particular, these considerations are unlikely to be useful for those FDA actions that shape the behavior of
 firms rather than the access of consumers, because firms are typically sophisticated rational actors without
 the same magnitude of information asymmetries or cognitive biases. These ideas are also presented as
 thought-provoking possibilities, not as fully defensible proposals.
But even to engage in this form of creative regulation the FDA itself may need a nudge. The FDA is used to
 using the blunter tools of approval and prohibition. Those tools are baked into the agency’s organic statute
 and generations of practice. Moreover, the FDA has considerable incentive to use the more restrictive tools
 available to it since it is usually the first to be blamed when something goes wrong, but receives little praise
 when it permits patients to get what they want. One legacy of our colleague Cass Sunstein’s tenure at the
 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is the introduction of choice architecture and soft paternalist
 approaches into government regulation. Even libertarians should prefer soft paternalism to the hard sort the
 FDA is prone to use. With that in mind, we encourage libertarians and paternalists interested in the FDA’s
 mandate to consider whether these new, “nudged” forms of regulation might satisfy both constituencies, at
 least in part. We think they can.
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